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ABSTRACT
Two conflicting views of Tibet's political status in relation to China have
dominated both popular and scholarly literature. The 'pro-Chinese' school views Tibet
as a traditional, integral part of China. Tibet, they maintain, was separated from China
after the fall of the Manchu dynasty as a consequence of British machinations. Tibet
was justifiably reunited with China, the 'motherland', in 1951. The 'pro-Tibetan'
school argues that the partnership was between the Dalai Lama and the Manchus: that
relationship ended with the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Accordingly, Tibet is seen
as an independent state conquered by the Chinese Communists and illegally incorporated
into the Chinese state. ^ This study is not an attempt to enter that debate, but rather to fill
a gap in a neglected aspect of Tibetan studies. Nonetheless, the results of this study
will, no doubt, become a component in the highly politicized nature of Tibetan history.
Sir Charles Bell's authoritative Tibet. Past and Present (1924) and Portrait of a
Dalai Lama (1946) both stand as important primary sources for this study. As
secondary sources dealing with British policy, W. D. Shakabpa's pioneering study
Tibet: A Political History (1967), P. Mehra's The McMahon Line and After (1974) and
A.K.J. Singh's Himalayan Triangle (1988) are indispensable. Alastair Lamb's most
recent study, Tibet. China and India 1914-1950 (1989), is the first publication to deal
with this period in detail. Lamb expertly evaluates Anglo-Tibetan relations and narrows
the gap which this thesis study is also designed to close. However, by locating AngloTibetan relations in the wider context of international politics, this dissertation will
augment Lamb's study and contribute to the continuing intellectual debate in the field of
Tibetan studies.
Tibet has been significant in the political development of British India, for it was
believed to be a key to the safety and security of India's north-eastern frontier. When
the British consolidated their power in the sub-continent of India, they were also faced
with the problem of securing a stable frontier on India's Himalayan borders. The British
government, therefore, had to evolve a definite policy towards the Himalyan kingdoms,
especially Tibet. British India's policy during the 19th century was to treat Tibet as a
buffer state.
There can be no doubt that the loss of Tibet's independence stems directly from
the failure of the British Govemment's Younghusband Mission of 1904 to achieve what
the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, hoped would result from it. Curzon believed that the

M. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet 1913-1951: The Demise of the
Lamaist State (Berkely, 1989), p. xv.
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only way to guarantee the continuance of Tibet as a buffer was to ensure the
predominance of British influence at Lhasa. This was to be achieved by bringing Tibet
under some measure of British protection or influence. Curzon believed that British
influence was essential because unless Britain laid claim to Tibet, Russia would draw
Tibet into its sphere of influence. After the First World War Britain again had an
opportunity to become Tibet's 'protector' but as was the case after 1904, chose to
abandon Tibet to Chinese expansionism.
Tibet, even today, conjures up images of 'Shangri-la', 'the savage and the
sublime' and, perhaps, 'paradise lost'. It is, however, far from remote or picayune to
world history. Tibet represents the interface between the two most populous nations on
earth and marks the site of one of the most complex boundary disputes ever to disturb
the peace of nations. The problems on India's northern frontiers have become a tangled
mass of diplomatic perplexity to the governments and people of India and China.
The loss of Tibet as a buffer zone between two major world powers has
produced major long-term consequences. The Chinese domination of Tibet

has

presented the current Indian Republic with just those dangers which Curzon feared
would confront the British-Indian Empire from the extension into Tibet of the influence
of Tsarist Russia. Tibet's role today as a garrison state of China goes far towards
explaining its important place in current Westem geopolitical thought. Tibet has become
a major handicap to China's political stability. The fate of modern Tibet, and the
problems of India's northern frontiers, are subjects of recent political debate. Tibet's
destiny in a broader sense and in these days of national self-determination is now a
concern of world conscience.
It is difficult to comprehend the current situation in Tibet and its place in the
policy of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India without an
understanding of what happened during the period of British colonial domination in
India. The British carry some responsibility for the present state of affairs of Tibet. The
question at issue is what responsibility should the British accept and what explanations
are there for Britain's inability to prevent the loss of Tibetan independence? The answer
to these questions lie in an analysis of the wider pattern of Anglo-Chinese political
relations and of intemational relations after the First World War.
Over the years scholars have trodden a well-wom path to the documents dealing
with Anglo-Tibetan affairs held in the Public Record Office and the India Office Library.
These documents have, more often than not, been used to compose historical surveys
which examine chronological events and often result in Anglo-Tibetan relations being
analysed in isolation from the broader intemational context. The primary information on
which this study is based provides a level of detail and understanding of the 1920s and
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1930s that has not previously been available. Many studies have been made of the 1904
Younghusband Mission, the 1913-14 Simla Conference and the later period of the 1940s
and 1950s. The 1920s and 1930s have been overshadowed by the turbulent decades
that preceded and succeeded them. These years have usually been given meaning only as
a transition period and have assumed the character of a more or less featureless interval:
a static period in Anglo-Tibetan relations.
The relationship formed between British India and Tibet by the resolution of the
1914 Simla Conference appeared unaltered and fundamentally unquestioned until the
transfer of power to an independent Indian government. This, however, was not the
case. During this period two major policy shifts took place. The apparent continuity
conceals the intensity of debates over Tibetan policy in the British and Indian
governments, especially during the years 1919-1921 and 1932-33, which disclosed
Britain's apprehension about the volatile political situation in central and north Asia
during and after the First World War. The destiny of Tibet has normally been treated as
if it was almost exclusively determined by Anglo-Chinese relations. This approach
ignores the fact that after the First World War the Tibetan question become an important
component of a much broader controversy on the course of post-war British policy in
Asia.
The major reasons given for the Chinese incapacity to conclude a Tibetan
agreement with Britain during the 1920s have been civil strife and popular opposition
within China. The general consensus on the reason for Britain's inability to persuade
the Chinese to resume negotiations is the aspiring mood of nationalism in China itself
Indeed this is part of the answer, but the other part is that China was awakening to the
fact that Britain's power and position in the Far East had been substanfially decreased
because of the First World War. Britain no longer had the diplomatic strength needed to
bluff China into concluding a settlement of the Sino-Tibetan dispute.
It is generally felt that China's intransigence and, at the same time, her weakness
gave the Foreign Office no alternative but to sanction a policy of close Anglo-Tibetan
relations without reference to China. On the surface this appears to be accurate but it
overlooks the general context of Britain's economic situation in the Far East. This, in
turn, reflected significant changes in the balance of power in Asia. Britain's position in
the Far East had diminished and pressure from the British Legation in Peking, the Far
Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and the British commercial community in
China operated to shift the main emphasis of British policy in Asia from one of reliance
on Japan to closer links with the United States and with a renascent China.
With hindsight it can be seen that British policy decisions made during this
period were crucial to Tibet's future.

This study aims to place this period in the
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important position it should hold in any debate of Anglo-Tibetan relations. The
'forgotten years' deserve a more prominent place in Tibetan studies.
The beginning date of 1912, or in Tibetan, the year of Water-Mouse, was the
year in which the 13th Dalai Lama returned from two years of exile in British India and
declared independence for Tibet. 1933, the year of Water-Bird, was the year in which
the 13th Dalai Lama died. The intervening years covered a period of Anglo-Tibetan
relations which seem to indicate a movement towards the independence and development
of Tibet under the umbrella of British influence. It can be seen in retrospect, however,
that British influence in Tibet during the intervening years gradually declined. It was the
realisation of this fact which prompted the major question: Why did Britain draw away
from relations with Tibet? What were the socio-political and cultural issues that caused
Britain to withdraw?
The First World War did irreparable damage to the structure of imperialist
diplomacy. This fact sets the stage for a discussion of Anglo-Tibetan relations during
the 1920s and 1930s. The undermining of the old order came about in two ways. On
the one hand, Japanese expansion on the continent, coupled with the temporary distress
of the European powers, destroyed the balance in the Far East which, though always
precarious, the imperialists had managed to maintain. On the other hand, there were
new forces undermining the very foundation of the old diplomacy - the 'new diplomacy'
of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the self-conscious assertion of
nationalism in China. It was Tibet's particular misfortune to be caught in the clutch of
two powerful neighbours, Britain and China, who used her as a pawn in the
compassionless game of political intrigue and diplomacy during the inter-war period.
In attempting to answer the central question it is essential to connect the AngloTibetan relationship to the intemational situation in which it operated. In tracing the
British response to these intemational determinants, a chronological treatment is used.
Each chapter therefore contains an evaluation which places Anglo-Tibetan relations in
this wider context, identifying the economic, social and political ideas which set the
historical boundaries within which British policy decisions operated.
The central problem of Britain's relations with Tibet has required research based
on the archives of the British Foreign Office, housed in the Public Record Office in
London, and supplemented by records in the India Office Library. These comprise a
massive collection of letters, telegrams, notes, minutes, reports of the British and Indian
governments, including many from the Tibetan and Chinese governments. The principal
collection used are the Political and Secret Department Subject Files.
The Australian National Library in Canberra has on microfilm the Foreign Office
series relating to China which covers political correspondence from 1906 to 1922. In

this series is a vast amount of information relating to Anglo-Tibetan relations. The
Library also holds original copies of the Foreign Office Confidential prints (1840-), the
only set outside Great Britain. Records and manuscripts held in the Library of Tibetan
Works and Archives in Dharamsala, India, have also produced some information.
The private papers of Sir Charles Bell, Colonel Bailey, Colonel Weir, all of
whom visited Lhasa during their time as British Political Officers, adds another
dimension to the study. The diaries of Bell, Bailey, Frank Ludow, who set up the first
British school in Tibet, and Captain R. S. Kennedy, who accompanied Bell to Lhasa as
a medical officer, have also been consulted. These private papers are held at the India
Office Library and the British Library. Books written by principal figures, such as
Charles Bell, Eric Teichman, Henry Hayden, David Macdonald, WiUiam McGovem and
Hugh Richardson, have also been studied as primary source material. Publications by
Tibetan authors, R. D. Taring, R. Lha-Mo, K. Dondup, D. N. Tsarong, D. Norbu and
T. J. Norbu have contributed a valuable Tibetan perspective.
Interviews with surviving participants and observers have been especially useful,
particularly regarding personal character details. Some interviews were tape-recorded in
Tibetan and later translated and transcribed, others were translated into English during
the interview. Interviews with English-speaking participants were typed directly into a
computer data base.
An application for a research visa for access to the National Archives in New
Delhi, India, was successful. However, the application took nearly eighteen months to
process and arrived too late for me to make use of the opportunity.
Summary:
With the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet in 1912 the British govemment saw an
opportunity to consolidate their influence in Tibet and re-establish Tibet as a buffer zone.
The declaration of Tibetan independence inspired and facilitated a programme of
development by the 13th Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama intended to initiate changes,
political as well as social, which were necessary if his country was to remain
independent.
The revived problem of a Russian 'menace' in Central Asia was the primary
reason for London to exert pressure on China to attend a conference at Simla in 1914.
During the conference the British developed a comprehensive programme to revise the
status of Tibet. The Anglo-Tibetan Simla Agreement, in effect, proved to be an unequal
bargain. In return for India's frontier security, the Tibetans were promised diplomatic
and military support in their stmggle with China. From the viewpoint of the Tibetans,
the 1914 Anglo-Tibetan agreement identified Britain as 'Tibet's Protector'. Yet, in spite
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of all the discussion on the status of Tibet, the notion of concluding some form of
protectorate agreement with the Lhasa govemment was never contemplated. Instead,
Britain proclaimed Chinese 'suzerainty' over an 'autonomous' Tibet. The recognition of
Chinese suzerainty was to safeguard British commercial interest in China and the
support of Tibetan autonomy was to ensure security of India's northern frontier. This
provided Britain with informal control of Tibet without involving the granting of
responsible govemment and, at the same time, allowed Britain to continue her stationary
economic imperialism in China.
1914 ushered in the Great War, which transformed global politics. During the
war years Britain was not prepared to, nor in a position to give, active military
assistance to Tibet and the opportunity for building a close relationship with an
autonomous Tibet diminished. Taking up arms against China for the sake of Tibetan
independence was never a consideration. The Dalai Lama considered that Britain had
made a commitment to support and protect Tibet by signing the Anglo-Tibetan
Agreement. By 1918 he was very disillusioned. The question at issue by the end of the
war was whether Britain was in a position to offer any form of diplomatic assistance or
protection to Tibet.
While China was deemed at the commencement of the First World War not to be
a threat to Tibet, the war emphasised the increased danger of a China controlled by
Japan. It soon became clear that Japan would attempt to take advantage of the war to
expand her influence on the mainland of Asia. Despite this ominous situation, it seemed
that pre-war circumstances were reviving in which British pressure would eventually
overcome obstinate Chinese resistance, and an agreement on Tibet's status would be
achieved.
The world, however, was a different place after 1918. During the First World
War and the period of post-war settlement British interests in China had radically to be
redefined. Altering intemational economic patterns, changing imperial priorities, rising
nationalism in the Far East, and the growth of new ideologies all had repercussions. The
predominant theme in Anglo-Tibetan relations during the next few years was Britain's
attempt to procure Chinese participation in renewed negotiations over Tibet and Peking's
constant refusal, under an assortment of excuses, to oblige. The British govemment's
response to this rejection on the part of the Chinese govemment was to send a mission
to Lhasa.
The sending of a mission to Lhasa and the eventual agreement to supply arms
and aid to Tibet were viewed at the time as manifesting a new determination in British
policy. Its principal result was supposedly to demonstrate that the British govemment
intended to treat Tibetan autonomy as a reality by strengthening Tibet's ability to defend
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itself and by helping to develop the country's resources. Bell's mission to Lhasa, in
reality, was a diplomatic bluff to coerce China into resuming negotiations, a bluff which
failed. Further indefinite delay, coupled with a continuance of the policy of self-denial,
would have involved the risk of the Chinese regaining control over Tibet, as had
happened in 1910.
The British feared that the Tibetan govemment would conclude an independent
treaty with China. Policy makers were faced with the choice of continuing to work for a
settlement on existing lines, and mnning that risk, or of taking other measures to protect
British interests by adopting a new and more liberal policy towards the Tibetans, which
would entail the eventual opening of Tibet and the development of its resources under
British auspices. It appeared that Tibet was being drawn more firmly under the umbrella
of British influence. With British support, the 1920s seemed to promise a
transformation of Tibet: a breaking away from old traditions and a move towards the
radimentary development of technological, economic and military infrastmctures which
would enable Tibet to become a self-sustaining independent state. Both Charles Bell,
Political Officer, Sikkim, and the Government of India wanted a non-interference
policy. At the same time they wanted Britain to help develop Tibet in a way that would
enable the country to retain its independence but also serve British interests.
The eventual decision to provide military assistance and aid symbolised not a
new tenacity of purpose but Britain's inability to intimidate China into accepting an
ultimatum. The adoption of the so-called 'new and liberal' policy which followed
Charles Bell's mission to Lhasa was little more than an attempt to induce the Chinese
govemment to abandon their obstmctive attitude and conclude a settlement of the Tibetan
question. The British hoped that the spectacle of Tibet's adoption of a policy of selfdevelopment would coerce the Peking government into submission. In retrospect,
however, it can be seen that the support given to Tibet was inadequate and the direction
which British policy took during the 1920s and 1930s resulted in the eventual loss of
Tibet's independence.
The conceptual basis of Britain's new policy was flawed: Britain wanted Tibet
as a buffer but was not prepared to give the support necessary for it to remain
independent. The source of Britain's impaired policy is manifest. On the one hand, they
were committed by a promise to the Lhasa govemment to support Tibet in upholding her
practical autonomy, which was of importance to the security of India, and, on the other
hand, Britain's alliance with China made it difficult to give effective material support to
Tibet.
What the British wanted was to create a balance. That is to say, give just enough
support so that Tibet could protect India's Himalayan border without the British having
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to commit themselves to a major defensive initiative, while allowing the Tibetans,
meanwhile, to pay for the honour of doing so. The intention was to convince the
Chinese that Tibet was becoming self-sufficient. The ultimate objective was to get the
Chinese to sign an agreement which would secure, for the British stability in Central
Asia. British tactics were impotent and the Foreign Office adopted a 'wait-and-see'
approach which dissolved into a 'dormancy' policy.
The 1921 Washington Conference represented the crossroad in Anglo-Tibetan
policy. Britain's wider economic and political considerations at this time altered AngloTibetan relations. Britain's Tibetan policy was impaired, as statesmen attempted to
cope with the transition between pre-war commitments and post-war attitudes. The
British government's post-war position made cooperation with the United States, or at
least avoidance of American displeasure, the sine qua non of any successful policy.
Britain's Tibetan policy during the 1920s and 1930s was to have no policy - to drift: a
symbolic act which reflected the decline of British imperialism. The British found
themselves on the defensive in the Far East and a desire to retain their trade position in
China became dominant. Especially after the 1925 anti-British boycott in China,
Britain followed a conciliatory policy and supported Chinese nationalism.
The implementation of Britain's new China policy during the late 1920s
coincided with a period of intemal political turmoil in Tibet. The critical years for the
Tibetan reformation were the 1920s, when the 13th Dalai Lama was attempting to
strengthen and develop his nation. British govemment policy during this period limited
the embryonic reforms and ultimately led to a weak and unstable Tibet.

The Lhasa

government exhibited a 'spirit of independence' but by 1925 the Dalai Lama was
moving his allegiance away from Britain towards China. The Chinese Nationalist
govemment took advantage of this tendency and adopted a 'forward' policy.
By 1933 British commercial interests in China made it necessary to subordinate
Indian policy towards Tibet to the wider British approach to China. Britain withdrew
from relations with Tibet because post-war intemational political and economic changes
hastened the demise of the British Empire and required Britain to support Chinese
nationalism. Britain had to choose either to support and protect Tibet or look after her
own interests. Britain, not unnaturally, chose to do the latter.
A limitation to this study has been Australia's geographical isolation from areas
of Tibetan studies and the scarcity of scholars involved in Tibetan studies in Australia,
and especially in the University of Wollongong. My decision to undertake a study of
Tibet for my Ph.D dissertation initially met with much scepticism within my History
department. However, Dr. Ian McLaine agreed to supervise me provided a thesis could
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legitimately be developed from a British point of view. I remain grateful for his
confidence in me. The absence of scholarly interaction has made my study a solitary
and arduous task. Despite modem communication technology, the scholarly debate stiU
remains a vital element in the process of history writing. To some extent this limitation
was reduced by my participation in the Sixth International Conference on Tibetan
Studies in Norway in 1992, and I would like to acknowledge my appreciation to the
Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, Oslo, for the allocation of funds
towards my participation.

